The dissemination of propaganda can neither be underestimated or ignored in the role of the revolutionary situation that we aim to achieve. At the same time, it is propaganda as the most major issue in guerrilla war, that works within the capitalist framework that we intend to overthrow. Whilst active guerrilla units already own their own propaganda cells, this booklet is researched for those guerrillas; for those already fighting the State, as well as the people in general who may, or may not as that may be, ever have to be in the knowledge of how a guerrilla unit is run. In this, the publication you hold explains the workings of a "terrorist campaign" as is necessary within the discussion of propaganda and dissemination. In this, briefly, we follow the original strategy of the First of May: that in times of social "instability", the people must be aware of how a "terrorist" unit can be run, in the name of our own autonomy against the possibility of a military or fascist take over of the revolution, or anything else. The issue of social instability will be discussed later within, as this pamphlet is intended to offer practical solutions to the problems involved in the practical overthrow of the State.

In this, two issues must be taken into account. The most important of these is, that any information discussing the strategy of revolution, will immediately get into the hands of the enemy. We can not help this. Therefore the information in this publication is put in such a way, that this information cannot be corrupted by the State. It is a complete run down that cannot be changed unless it is necessary that it should be in the name of guerrilla warfare itself.

The second point is that, this information is entrusted to the people of the revolution in good faith. It is not the responsibility of the author how this information be used. But the advice of the First of May was that, the State are ready to stamp on any opposition at any stage. It is not our advice that guerrillas should try to provoke the State into imposing any state of oppression. It is our intention to offer our advice to the people, should there be any situation whereby it should be necessary that this knowledge be in the hands of the masses.

This booklet is the culmination of a number of years of campaign by an organisation setting up to challenge authority from within a psychiatric hospital. This resistance existed as a paramilitary propaganda group, although this group never had the firepower to do anything other than to issue a number of communiqués to try to agitate for unrest in the name of the struggle against capitalism that ran into the turn of the century. Eventually this strategy ran into the 'Mission Statement' that opens this introduction. Inevitably this group ultimately earned the right to call ourselves a paramilitary; due to the nature of the 'campaign', as we called ourselves (or the 'Advocation' as we invented the term to justify propaganda as guerrilla). This justification came from the stance of our propaganda being to riot in retalliation against the State monitoring of thought; under that same situation as we exploited it. That same propaganda is collected into four books, entitled 'Chaoticism', which are anti copyright, and which underline the stance of the 'Advocation', as paramilitary propaganda.

Learning from that experience, this booklet is intended as a user manual in all aspects of urban guerrilla warfare. This manual will not tell you how to make explosives; but all other aspects of the practical side of running a guerrilla movement should be covered within these pages. The rundown of how to run a paramilitary cell are covered as follows:

CHAPTER ONE.Is it really necessary?Guerrilla war as a last resort.The objectives of a guerrilla campaign.Structure of the group.A strategy for manoeuvres.Planning the propaganda stance.

CHAPTER TWO.Security.Propaganda as a guerrilla tactic.Planning the propaganda campaign.Practicalities of propaganda:Subversion and Dissemination.

CHAPTER THREE.When the group has established.Funding.Radio and the Internet.Expanding the issue.Setting up to escalate the cause of the revolution, and its importance.

CHAPTER FOUR.The State.Counter propaganda.The media (and the monitoring of thought), the police and security, prison and sectioning.

CHAPTER FIVE.A discussion of the role of the guerrilla in the setting of the revolutionary group.Further researching the role of the cause and public support.Political representation.Demands and the nature of revolution.Prison support.


This should briefly cover the main workings of the guerrilla group, based on the stance of the propaganda cell, and emphasising the importance of the propaganda group in the situation of guerrilla war.Further than that, the information in this booklet will be based on the running of my own group, and from my own participation in guerrilla struggle.

As one last point, I would like to say that this information is based on my own experience of running a propaganda group.Further information is available in the form of guerrilla press publications, which discuss both the philosophical and practical issues involved with the revolution of current day Britain.These publications are available from ourselves, to borrow or to publishers, in return for a donation.


Guerrilla Warfare.Che Guevara.Penguin Books 1968.

Towards a Citizens Militia.First of May.Date unknown.Available from Freedom Books.

Propaganda Groups.The Guerilla Press.I.S.B.N. 0-9536727-1-6.Available from ourselves


"In all eras, and under any epoch, there will always be a multitude of arguments for not fighting.But not fighting must surely be the quickest way in which not to win our own freedom".



Guerrilla warfare is always the result of an opposing point of view from the authority of the State.Whether this be the issue of the occupation of a country by a foreign State, or the oppressive actions of the State against a minority, the issue of guerrilla warfare is always a reality.To the guerrilla unit, representative democracy is not the answer.To this, the question should be whether to wait for the revolution, or to agitate towards one.In all cases, the guerrilla will be of the opinion that the revolution is a necessary escalation of violence.The question, however, must be, if there is a justification for the succession of violence, then will it have the support of the people?If not, then the question must be, is a succession of guerrilla violence really necessary?This pamphlet is essentially about the issue of support from the people, and whether the propaganda of the State can be countered?

If such a resort to violence is a minority issue, such as the cause of animal liberation, then propaganda is more of a cultural issue than that of the organised Independence Militia.Despite this, propaganda is an important issue for any and every guerrilla organisation.As the issue of "is it really necessary?" is discussed, this is the first question in setting up a guerrilla unit, and is therefore the first issue to be discussed by the propaganda unit.

The answer is that, if guerrilla warfare is necessary, as we believe it is, then propaganda is a necessary part of any guerrilla cause.That is what this work is set out to discuss.However, as a start to this work on propaganda, I feel it necessary to discuss some of the issues involved in setting up in the on going struggle against tyranny.


In evaluating the issues involved in setting up a guerrilla unit, you should always bear in mind that there are always casualties on both sides.It may be that you are intending to join in the struggle of an already established guerrilla cause such as the A.L.F. or the I.R.A.If the situation is that you are setting up a new organisation, then this booklet should help.Either way, it is concurrently upheld by guerrillas, that, in all circumstances, the emancipation of the bomb and the gun, should be the last resort.

Of course, it may be that you intend to set up an autonomous group operating through a strategy of spray painting and gluing locks, such as the strategy of most of the A.L.F.; or even an agitational group setting up to disseminate propaganda alone, such as the strategy of ourselves before this publication.Either way, there are issues involved to a greater or lesser degree, however you intend to proceed.The main point is that, guerrilla warfare has very serious consequences; it is feared and greatly oppressed by authority; if there are deaths involved (Rastas only support the destruction of property), then guerrilla warfare should be employed only as a last resort.

1.3.At the time of writing, the current era is one of success for those of us who have fought the oppression of Conservative Party State.Ireland has been declared an independent nation due to the demands of the I.R.A., and animal rights campaigners are seeing their demands being met.This is encouraging for a number of other guerrilla causes.

But these victories have not been won without casualties.This booklet focuses primarily on the work of the A.L.F. and the I.R.A., as the majority of other units are 'counter terrorist'; therefore being against the cause of guerrilla struggle in the name of the revolution.

The I.R.A. have no vanguards, and many have died in the past two decades due to the struggle against hunting.This does not mean that there are no martyrs.But at the same time we should remember the hundreds of comrades who have spent years in prisons and mental hospitals due to the oppression of these causes.Our point is that, every individual who enters guerrilla struggle, should be aware of this as a greater issue; and anyone setting up an organisation whereby people could be imprisoned or killed, should examine these examples as very serious indeed.Although this may seem obvious to anyone involved in these, or any of the many other issues worldwide, it is to be pointed out that these issues are potentially the most important issues to consider.Essentially, the foundation of a guerrilla cause is not an issue to be taken lightly.Although less serious, propaganda for he guerrilla cause is going to be oppressed to an equal degree to that of the explosives cells.Guerrilla warfare may be the only contort to the oppression of the State but, with this taken into consideration; guerrilla warfare should be considered the last resort.


In countering the State, we must be clear that the capitalists have very clear objectives.This applies not only to the multinationals and the Satanic Church, but also the army and all forms of government themselves.Therefore revolutionaries must have our own clear objectives and, in this, the guerrilla unit is no exception.These objectives must be clear, they must be reasonable, and above all they must be realistic.Learning from the lessons of the Angry Brigade of the '70s and the Desperadoes of the '90s, we must remember that it is not possible to instigate revolution alone.We must remember that the revolution is the amassed retalliation of the people, and that any vanguard organisation can very easily be crushed by authority if they should pose a realistic threat to the State.A guerrilla cell sets out a clear objective of what they can achieve.In working for the guerrilla cell, the propaganda group must set out its own clear objective; based on the guerrilla campaign in itself, the various units individually and as a whole and, most importantly, its own role within the issue of the guerrilla campaign, the revolution, and its own role within the issues as defined herein.The propaganda group operates as a unit within itself, but must at all times have close contact with the struggle, not just of the guerrilla cause; but also of the issues of the cause and the struggle as a greater issue.The propaganda group must have clear objectives.And it must have its ear to the ground.

1.5.These objectives must be based on what can realistically be achieved.In practise this can be more difficult than it sounds.Whilst the I.R.A. have achieved negotiations, and animal liberation have won concessions from a "new left wing" State, this is only a small part of the struggle that is concurrent every day to topple power."The absolute destruction of all power" is obviously the demand.But in practicality this is not going to be achieved without the motivation of the masses (as could have been achieved through the protests against the Poll Tax).Therefore guerrillas adopt a "revolutionary strategy".More on this later in 'A Strategy for Manoeuvres'.The point is that, the objectives towards this goal must be realistic and, at the same time, they must be planned to result in a situation that will realistically achieve the purposes of a guerrilla campaign, i.e. "The end of the oppression of the prostitutes as a form of control to the ends of a dictatorial State".That was the objective of the previous front that wrote this pamphlet, and this objective was not realised due to lack of firepower although, through the struggle to uphold this we have initiated the discussion of prostitution and guerrilla warfare in youth culture.However, despite this, the work involved in setting up a propaganda group in the name of these demands has enlightened us in the procedure involved and the tactics of propaganda and dissemination, and this objective will be followed as the hypothesis for the guerrilla struggle supported in this work.


With objectives discussed, as was covered only very briefly in 1.4. and 1.5., the structure of the unit as a whole should be decided upon.

Taking into consideration the history of successful guerrilla structure in this country, as covered above, the strategy for the structure of a guerrilla cell, is most probably that of a large number of small scale, independent and autonomous cells operating in accordance with a structured set of aims and views.This is how guerrilla struggle in Britain and Ireland has operated for the last twenty years.However, these groups should be supported by a minimum number of propaganda groups; groups that should be as structured and as organised as possible.We suggest that these groups operate along the lines of non profit groups, with good relations with the press.

1.7.Figure 1.6.1., is only one suggested view of the structure of a guerrilla unit.In practicality the group is much more complicated than this, as you will see if you read any book on the history of the I.R.A.Still, for the purposes of this work, Diagram 1.6.1. works for our purposes.It explains on a very fundamental level the structure of a single autonomous organised cell.Diagram 1.6.1. is explained briefly as follows:

1.8.COMMAND UNIT.Heads are as equal to guerrillas as guerrillas are equal to press negotiators.The role of the head (we do not have 'Godfathers'), is to co-ordinate the strategy and the running of the unit (or in this case we consider the workings of one individual collective "cell".The propaganda unit may work for one or many separate units or cells).The strategy of the group may be targets hit, or tactics differing from arson or gunfire, and the running of the group, as discussed later, might be financial support for families of interned guerrillas etc.See below.In an autonomous cell such as that detailed in Figure 1.6.1., a head has no authority to hand out punishment, except for a supergrass situation; the concourse to this in our own organisation being to tattoo a supergrass symbol on the individuals forehead.In the discussion of a guerrilla unit, many groups have a system whereby the head is known only by one guerrilla, who can pass on orders on a personal level and so forth.This lessens the possibility of anyone grassing, intentionally or otherwise, and is a very sound procedure to follow.A head should be seen to be a normal working class citizen with respect for the law and few political pretences.All decisions should be passed on verbally (possibly in code), and nothing should ever be written down.Heads should always be in an equal situation with everyone else in the group, from explosives planters to press spokespersons, but should know how to keep a low profile whilst making informed directives in the knowledge of moves from State security, and intelligence from propaganda groups ourselves.Furthermore, nothing else needs to be said about the heads of each unit: they are there to make decisions: they are equal, but propaganda is what we are out to discuss.

1.9.GUERRILLAS.As we discuss tactics and propaganda, it must be remembered that guerrillas themselves are by far the most important part of the whole issue.The propaganda unit will not know the guerrillas themselves in person, but will support their every move; regardless to anything else thrown at us by he State.The role of the guerrilla is to actively follow both the instructions of the groups head, and the constitution of the organisation as one thing.It may easily be the case that the cell runs autonomously with no head.Either way, the issue is the same, that the propaganda group exists to support the role of the guerrilla, as the highest priority of the group.

The role of the guerrilla is to uphold the instructions of the head, to her or his utmost ability, with intelligence and sus; to responsibly uphold the guerrilla unit and its cause; and then to be able to stay underground and unseen in the environment in which they live.

It is common in Ireland for Republican guerrillas to have built pockets of very strong support.The propaganda group should do their best to encourage and support such situations. In this, it should go without saying that the issue that is foremost, is that guerrillas, in general, are responsible, however indirectly, for the destruction of property.In this, guerrillas for whatever cause, should work to create a camaraderie (union of trust).This applies only to guerrillas that, by necessity, are obliged to interact on a 'one to one' level.This rule applies regardless to whether this be an arson unit, an assassination unit or just a graffiti front.One example of how such a 'union of trust' can be created, is the initiation of the French Resistance guerrilla, who's initiation was to sleep with a fifteen year old girl.Under this initiation, the girl was as equal with the unit, there was a trust of secrecy amongst the guerrillas, and secret police were exposed as they were not allowed to adulterate in such a setting.

Although this is a controversial example, it is a practical one.On all levels of the structure of the group, trust should be emphasised as imperative in the initiation, procedure and general practise of the entire scene.


The propaganda group and the guerrilla unit are never actually in direct communication (this being according to the experience of the group that write this manual.This is not a strict rule, but as a procedure, is strongly advised).The role of the propaganda unit as a part of the unit as a greater issue, and its role as a part of the guerrilla war itself, can not be understated.The role of the media is to uphold the State, as they are a part of the State, and good relations must be kept with the media, as far as is practical.The media are always looking for the opportunity to slander or discredit the guerrilla cause, but at the same time, have been described as "the guerrilla friend", due to the fact that they need us in order to have a cause to support.This is not the place to discuss the politics of the media; but a guerrilla unit must have a good philosophy as to the role of the press, as a part of the philosophy of the cause, as a part of the issue in itself.In the past the Situationist movement have developed complete philosophies over the issue of the media, and our own group used the media to set up in propaganda as an issue in itself.Further than that, the role of the propaganda group is essential in countering the bias of the media that will be inevitable in any situation of conflict.

1.11.In this example, the propaganda unit are not in communication with the guerrilla unit themselves.The objective is to support the every move of the direct action cell and, in this, the propaganda unit are in close contact with the guerrilla head.The guerrilla propaganda group will be in communication with the groups head; thus informing them of the actions of the rest of the unit and, where necessary, the role of other relevant cells.This prevents the unit from being misled as to the actions of the guerrilla unit, whilst keeping tight security.Further than that, the role of the propaganda unit is to follow and react to the reporting of the media, as Diagram 1.6.1. demonstrates.


As pointed out, the best strategy in a current day context for subversion and retalliation, seems to be the strategy of a small number of independent and autonomous groups working in accordance with the cause.There is no reason why this shouldn't be the case with propaganda organisations.To elaborate, there are few set rules, and there is no reason why a propaganda unit should have to support a guerrilla cause (although this is the context in which this booklet is written).In the past propaganda groups have often not followed a guerrilla as such, but instead supported the movements of riot.A strategy for manoeuvres must be decided upon by the entire group as it is initially set up, and should ideally be upheld by each cell.For example, if the strategy of the guerrilla unit is to plant explosives, then the strategy of the propaganda group would be to observe and respond to, all situations of explosive planting reported by T.V. and newspapers, and react through the instructions given by the groups heads.A propaganda group would not necessarily support all cases of explosives, but would act for the good of the unit and the guerrilla cause as a greater issue.

In this, all propaganda units should have a clear objective, set out in writing, and made public, which closely follows the 'Aims & Views' of each unit involved in the guerrilla struggle.This should set out the demands of the group to be issued to the press, and a clear strategy for the group should be decided initially, for the group to follow the line of the guerrilla.This leads us to the planning of a 'propaganda stance'.


It is assumed that, once the group as a whole have agreed upon their own 'objectives', the group will have a clear political stance.Therefore the guerrilla propaganda unit will be responsible for issuing communiqués and demands.So it may be surprising that a communiqué or demand, should not be too political.The Bardier Meinhoff and the Red Army Faction of the 60s', whilst having very clear objectives and sound political views, may have been responsible for alienating their own support, through being too political.It is thought that the response of many guerrilla organisations, to deliberate misunderstanding by the media, was to get still more political.In studies, it is thought that the more political a group become, the less people will relate, and therefore, the less support a communiqué will find.This should certainly be taken into consideration.The strategy of my own group was to be as political as possible, without 'firepower', in order to try to inspire a movement of direct action.At the same time the strategy of Class War was to be as direct and as easy for the everyday person to understand, as was practical.In this, Class War probably earned more support, and were probably more influential in the escalation of conflict than ourselves.

1.14.It is good for a political group to be aware of the stance of the public they support, but at the same time, the entire cause would be well to agree upon the principals of the movement.This is where it is good to have a clear 'manifesto'.The propaganda group should be responsible for this.

I feel that this would not be a good place to discuss the workings of the manifesto; except to say that there are a number of points to be taken into account.These are as follows:

The manifesto should be written to represent the issue and, in this, should primarily speak to sympathisers.

The manifesto should realistically take into account the initiatives and the limitations of the movement.

The manifesto should be political, but will be read by the enemies of the group.Therefore the manifesto should be as clear as possible, taking into account he arguments against; both against the issue (the cause), and the groups views towards guerrilla struggle itself.

1.15.The manifesto should represent the views of the movement as a whole, but at the same time, it will be printed and disseminated by the propaganda cell.This is the reason for civil rights for freedom of speech, but at the same time the propaganda group should be established in society, and not on the run for guerrilla activities themselves.The manifesto should be the primary representation of the 'stance' of the group.In this the role of the unit should be in upholding the manifesto.At the same time this is even more important to the propaganda unit, and no statements or communiqués should ever contradict the manifesto.If, by any chance the manifesto is contradicted in any way, a statement should be issued to the press to renounce and amend it.


"Violence for equality."


2.1.SECURITY.This, as an issue for the working of a guerrilla cell, is beyond the scope of what we should cover here.All the same, all guerrillas have an obligation not to allow anyone else in the organisation to be arrested in the event of their own arrest or questioning.Therefore, in propaganda, as with guerrilla operations as a whole, certain security rules must be observed.There can only be too much security, when it becomes conspicuous.For the purposes of this, we follow the security procedure suggested for propaganda by the First of May in 'Towards a Citizens Militia'.

2.2.The workings of the procedure involved with the practicalities of printing and dissemination are covered in more detail in the Guerilla Press agitational pamphlet, 'Propaganda Groups'.But the issue of security covered therein, is duplicated here for the purposes of context.

As a general rule in guerrilla warfare, there should be as few a number of personal contacts as is possible.The same is true when it comes to the practise of printing the groups propaganda as an issue in itself.

With this security rule taken into account, the suggestion of the First of May, is that there should always be a 'go between', before and during, the act of propaganda itself being taken to the printers.In short, the 'copy' (the originals of the propaganda being taken to the printers), should be taken to the printers and paid for, by an individual who has nothing more to do with the organisation, than in the role of taking copy to the printers in itself.The previous 'link' is the person responsible for the design and paste up of the propaganda and literature itself, and in this our representative should be elected by the unit themselves, on the assumption that this role is as important to the guerrilla cause, as is that of spokespersons and heads.Our go between is an equal guerrilla and, therefore, is under oath not to inform, and, in this, upholds her or his position as a guerrilla without information as to the workings of the group, as with the rest of the cell.This is the rule of guerrilla propaganda.

Therefore I see it as right to discuss the workings of this position within these pages.Being a booklet on propaganda, I see this as justified; the workings of a guerrilla cell should not be covered in any more detail than already discussed, in the name of the security of current issues in guerrilla warfare.


With this discussed, we can move on to the practical use and value of propaganda as a part of the guerrilla cause, and its role in a revolutionary context.

Propaganda does not necessarily have to support any guerrilla objective.And at the same time, there is no reason why the guerrilla cause should not be the dissemination of propaganda in itself.As an example of this, the history of the organisation who write this booklet, set out to do nothing more than to promote a guerrilla cause through propaganda in itself.In this, we were not actually guerrilla, although we upheld the principals of guerrilla warfare in the perpetuation of the dissemination of propaganda as a guerrilla cause against the authority of a psychiatric hospital.In this we issued our demands through propaganda, following it up with a petition to give it support, whilst at the same time not actually supporting an active guerrilla cause.The escalation of our own propaganda led to the large scale dissemination of 'Propaganda Groups'; an agitational publication designed to put pressure upon the government through motivating the people into setting up independent agitation groups in the hope of establishing a complex of propaganda groups operating independently along the lines of the A.L.F.This organisation still intend 'Propaganda Groups' to be a part of our strategy, and is available to sympathisers in orders of 100, for mass dissemination if anyone wants to support.But this is where the parameter between a guerrilla propaganda group, who should act as a spokesperson group, and a small press, who should act as a pressure group, divide.

It is at this stage that these parameters must be discussed.For example, the A.L.F. are one of the most influential guerrilla fronts to exist as a revolutionary cause.At the same time, one of their cells is the A.L.F. Press Office, who run as their equivalent of a propaganda unit, although they are a public organisation operating as a non profit group with fundraising and petitioning for organised support from the public, as well as the press.It is in this that the A.L.F. operate as a front, and it is in this that the study of small press and marketing operation should be considered.This should be kept in mind when planning how your propaganda group will be set up.


With everything so far taken into consideration, there is a real need to plan the operational stance of the 'press relations' or, what we are referring to as the 'propaganda campaign'.At this point it should be pointed out that there is no reason why the propaganda cell should not be an active guerrilla in itself.However, it is a better procedure to keep operations and propaganda separate if at all possible.

When planning the campaign, take into accounti) the operations and future objectives of the guerrilla,ii) the attitude of the press both to the individual actions that you set out to support, and the cause as a greater issue, andiii) the views of the sympathisers of the guerrilla unit and the reaction of the State to the actions of the group as a whole: the explosives campaign supported by the press release etc.

In planning the propaganda campaign, care should be taken to keep communiqués and statements as concurrent as possible, both in the content and the format.In planning the strategy of the group, representatives should be elected or instated to write the propaganda release, and these representatives should be undercover, with back-up copy and spokespersons available in the event of arrest.As covered earlier, it may be a suggestion to keep all communiqués straightforward; it may be best not to employ politics students et al in the first instance, although this may be a matter for discretion.

2.5.There is no room for mistakes, and propaganda groups do not have to make excuses.The strategy of the group must be planned according to everything discussed so far, and the mistakes of the unit must be accountable to heads, and not the propaganda cell or the guerrillas. In these circumstances, the propaganda group must be ready to make apologies.

The strategy of the group may take a number of different tactics, i.e. direct press statements or anonymous spokesperson statements issued to the press via the telephone or a pre arranged rendezvous, or a number of other strategies.We would suggest that a concurrent strategy be used throughout the cause as a single issue.With the issues discussed hence, there should be little difficulty in finding a strategy that is easy and effective.But remember security at all moments.Subversion and public support is discussed next.



2.6.Propaganda can be escalated without any input from propaganda units; for example, a guerrilla strategy to end biased reporting could be to bomb a broadcasting studio whilst it were broadcasting live.A guerrilla organisation should think like this; but any action is likely to be more productive with the support of organised propaganda.With an organised propaganda unit, there should be no difficulty in finding a media person with whom to issue statements etc.This accounted for, regardless to whether the group or the individual action has support, the public should always know why?This is currently called 'Telsa Retalliation'.

With press statements taken into consideration, the question of public support must be discussed.

2.7.As discussed, guerrilla warfare has no purpose, nor even reason without the support of the people.This goes without saying, but guerrilla warfare is usually a necessary escalation of the needs of a catalyst in response to the oppression of the State.Therefore a guerrilla unit will have support; as it necessitates support.The role of the propaganda group is to escalate this.

2.8.SUBVERSION.As a practicality of guerrilla war, a terrorist campaign is likely to have little or no media support.Therefore it is the role of the unit as a whole, as defined in Figure 1.6.1., to escalate the cause of which you are fighting for, and to build support from the people who are not following the media stance, as a necessity of the guerrilla strategy as a whole.In short you are speaking to the underground.It is the underground of your support that you should be speaking to in all press statements and communiqués.This is more or less difficult depending on the support and the nature of the cause.

Take, as an example, the conflicting attitude of the British people to the differing issues of the revolutionary Angry Brigade, and the foreign nationalist group, the Irish Republican Army.

2.9.The attitude of the British people against the struggle of the I.R.A. in a foreign country, has been absolutely appalling.On a large scale the public of England and Wales especially, has been distorted and manipulated by the media.Whilst this was also the case with the Angry Brigade whilst they were active, the I.R.A. fought an entirely separate issue.The strategy of the I.R.A. was to bomb direct targets in the name of their cause, whilst not issuing any form of propaganda to gain support from the British media or public, whilst the role of the Angry Brigade was much more idealistic; speaking to a mass underground of anarchism.Whilst the role of the I.R.A. was to win the independence of Ireland for an autonomous republic, they never had the support of the British, as did the Angry Brigade.This was not their intention.The I.R.A. had support in their own country, but not as the vanguards of the anarchist movement, as the Angry Brigade had in, what is now Britain, with Ireland devolving into an independent State.

The Irish struggle is far too complicated to be discussed properly here, except to say that the I.R.A., as a guerrilla organisation, were to see the near implementation of their demand, despite the mass support for the Angry Brigade that was apparent whilst they were active in the 70s'.Despite this, we see the issue of the I.R.A. to be more serious, if that can be said; and the pockets of I.R.A. support that were abundant, were hardcore pockets of support with influence.But the Angry Brigade did win popular support.

2.10.The I.R.A., as an issue, did not need the press support that was apparent with the Angry Brigade.This was due to the nature of the differing causes.The point is that, whilst the I.R.A. had demands, the Angry Brigade were a revolutionary issue; with objectives to overthrow the State and incite revolution.

In this, the Angry Brigade issued communiqués geared towards the inspiration of the masses to support guerrillas as a revolutionary issue.Much literature was printed by the anarchists and the Angry Brigade themselves.Whilst I.R.A. propaganda was geared towards the cause of the guerrilla units as one, Angry Brigade support was about revolution as a bigger issue.Angry Brigade propaganda was issued in a different manner.The anarchists supported them with their own propaganda, making it a cultural issue.This leads us to the 'Dissemination of Propaganda'.


The dissemination of propaganda is essential to the guerrilla cause; otherwise this booklet would not have needed to have been written.The traditional strategy for the dissemination of printed propaganda for the cause, as it is usually not for the benefit of any individual unit or cell, is to 'drop' a large number of leaflets from a tall building or plane.

In the history of the people who write this booklet, we have researched the practicalities of running a front group from the perspective of a pressure group, printing leaflets and stickers, and sending them to the various separate groups in various address listings.It emerges that the best reason for doing this is in order to distribute petitions or collect surveys for the cause.This is covered more in Chapter Three, 'Escalating the Cause', and further in Chapter Five.However, people who want a concise explanation of how dissemination can work for the guerrilla cause, can refer to our own publication, 'Propaganda Groups'.This publication is available in bulk from ourselves, and it is a suggestion that people consider buying a bulk number of copies for dissemination in the name of their own group.


"Who's gonna win the war?"



When the group has become established, as will be the case when the guerrilla has set up in contravention to the State, the main objectives may change.If this should be the case, the unit should take care not to change strategy.This tactic should be considered only in the event of an emergency, or in the event of the strategy of the direct action cell changing.When the group has established, the propaganda unit as a part of the greater issue, the strategy of the group, from explosives through to press statements, should be established.Ideally it would be the best idea to keep the strategy the same.In practise, the groups support since first setting up, may have lost momentum.This could be for a number of reasons, from lack of support for the line of the group, to unnecessary casualties in the name of the war, or anything else.Such a situation can arise easily, and this is often a situation that calls for the same change of tactics as in an emergency situation (that being the arrest or assassination of spokespersons, a supergrass etc.)In this situation, a change of tactics should be discussed as an issue involving the entire group as a greater entity.

3.2.When a propaganda group has successfully established, an escalation of public support will be apparent, and this should be exploited as integral to the continuation of the group.At all times the propaganda group should be talking to their supporters; making ends to build support from those who already sympathise, and then to earn support from the people on a greater scale.On the first level, those who the guerrilla cause has set out to support, will already be 'sympathetic' to the movement, as State media distortions will term it.On the next level, it is the role of the group to inform the people of the reasons for the latest arson, bomb or assassination and, in this, what the action and the campaign on a greater level wish to achieve.Further than that, the group should run in accordance with all the advice offered previously herein.

3.3.FUNDING.In some cases the group will be financed by the hierarchy (if such a thing exists), in other cases the group will be in charge of their own funding.In these cases we suggest units set up as a fundraising group; collecting for funds, as with the example of the A.L.F. support group.Either way, printing, postage, envelopes, box addresses etc. are expensive and have to be paid for.Again, more information on all of this is offered in our previous publication, 'Propaganda Groups'.This considered, it is legitimate for a paramilitary to offer support to its 'propaganda wing'.I feel that the discussion of this issue warrants an independent section:

3.4.If financed by a paramilitary, the propaganda group must go out to exploit this to the ends of the organisation as a whole.The propaganda group must make a point that they are financed from funds expropriated from the enemy, and go out to earn support for this.However, on a smaller scale, it may be more appropriate for the group to campaign through their own literature for the guerrilla cause, and through fundraising activities such as is the case with A.L.F. support groups.A point to bear in mind, is that it will be more productive if the group is open about being the faction of a paramilitary.This is for the following reasons:

i)   That if the paramilitary has proper support, then this will greatly help the cause of fundraising to perpetuate the revolution.

ii)That the propaganda group must be open about supporting the guerrilla if they are to build support for it.

iii) If the propaganda group ends up being arrested, as has been the case many times in the history of unrest, then they will need to be open about back up from, and their support for, the guerrilla cause.


The most effective way of fucking up the wheels of the State, is to assume control of these wheels of control themselves.Technology is an important part of the State itself, and the overthrow of technology stands as one of the most important tools available to the guerrilla.Revolutions from Cuba to the uprisings in Britain against the Poll Tax, have been heavily influenced by Pirate Radio.The Millennium Bug threatened the overthrow of the State in itself.The assumption of technology, if it is available, is the most important object in the subversion of the people.This subject is complex, thus necessitating that we discuss the issue over the next few sections.It should be considered that many guerrilla groups operate without these channels, whilst there are many propaganda units ('subversives'), that operate through Pirate Radio and CyberSpace, and nothing else.


Radio should never be underestimated as a tool for subversion, and is a primary tool for control from the State.Most successful guerrilla campaigns have utilised the subversion of Pirate Radio, and it is established as a primary tool for the propaganda of guerrilla campaigns.As well as being a tool for subversion, radio is also used as the communication integral to the running of the State.This is both in the control of the people through State propaganda, and in two way radios used to keep the 'services' organised against the rioting masses and guerrillas.Therefore two way radio channels must be monitored; and State propaganda countered.

Simple radio broadcast equipment can be made easily by anyone with a basic knowledge of electronics, and with sound communications, radio can be used directly to talk to sympathisers.Further than that it can be used to subvert the people on a greater scale for the benefit of the cause, both as a bigger issue, and against the general State propaganda against the guerrilla cause itself.

3.7.Pirate radio broadcast entails a degree of organisation.The people running it should be sussed in propaganda, and also be aware of the views of those who support the cause (should these views in any way differ from the objectives of the guerrilla campaign themselves).A sound organisational stance for a pirate radio group, should be similar to the structure of the guerrilla unit itself, and as much care should be taken to protect the radio group, as the guerrillas themselves.In the event of a radio unit being arrested, there should be back up units ready to support the radio group with the same line as that taken to support interned guerrillas themselves.

3.8.The structure of the broadcast itself should be geared towards the people you wish to support the campaign.There are a lot of people about with ideas and skills that can be utilised in the running of pirate radio for the guerrilla cause.If these people can stay undercover, then they should be employed.Respond to the feedback from the listeners, and set out to counter State propaganda.Remember to respond to criticism and, above all, use radio to organise practical support in the form of direct action; supporting graffiti, illegal demos and festivals, and all practical support for the guerrilla.


As forms of communication go, radio has proven to be much more important than the Internet.However, the Internet does have a role in guerrilla propaganda, despite the fact that it remains a relatively new form of communication.All the same, with everything taken into consideration, the Internet does have limitations.With this taken into consideration, CyberSpace does have a purpose in propaganda - primarily in issuing information to those who are looking for it, and then in the dissemination of printed matter.Both of these tactics can be employed for the distribution of manifestos and, in the future, the Internet will be the main form of communication for statements and communiqués (see 'Conclusion).

3.10.In disseminating propaganda on the Internet, the first thing that has to be remembered, is that anyone finding your page, has to be looking for it.This poses advantages and disadvantages.For a start, if it is information that it is vital the group get around, then it is probably best not to use the Internet for these purposes.At the same time, if you need to quickly and anonymously issue a longer statement, that can not be distributed on the scale of mass dissemination, it can be a good idea to put the statement on the Internet, and then just to circulate the Site address to the government and press (or whoever you wish to communicate to).The Internet address should be circulated over the phone, through advertising or, if possible, through the press themselves.

It costs nothing to set up a Web Site, and it is relatively easy to do.E-mail offers guerrillas a far wider scope for communication than has ever been known, and many people have access to the necessary Internet facilities to make communication possible.Failing this it is usually possible for the guerrilla to use CyberCafes.There are no rules as to what you can put on the Internet, and the only problem that I can see with this means of dissemination, is that it can be difficult to remove a page once it has been uploaded.Still, this may be an advantage, and this system is a lot cheaper than printing.

3.11.The other main use for the Internet, apart from computer hacking (covered in 3.13., and in Conclusion), is the possibility of setting up small scale radical 'book shops'.This tactic has been employed to a small degree of success by ourselves, and the main point to remember, is that in order to make this system work, the most important point is to make people aware of your site 'address'.

A 'virtual book shop' can be used for disseminating a large number of publications, as is the case with our own Site, or just propaganda for the group directly upheld.E-mail can be used to get peoples addresses, and a database of supporters can then be compiled for the purposes of mailouts.

3.12.An Internet address can be used to positively serve the purposes of the propaganda group.As with our own literature, our address is printed on the insert of all our publications.Important texts can be supported or duplicated on the Internet, and there are a number of strategies to build support for a press group on the Internet.A good example of this can be found at the Website at the start of this book, which is the address of the virtual book shop that this group operate around (in the case of our own group we are supporting propaganda without the legal implications involved with supporting an armed guerrilla).


"Computer Terrorism" is the future.Computer hacking is a form of guerrilla warfare that has, to date, never properly been employed to the revolutionary cause.It is beyond the scope of this publication to discuss the practicalities of computer "hackery", and this is better taken as the role of the active guerrilla, although propaganda groups could potentially do well to learn the technicalities of the subject.

The theory of computer terrorism is covered in greater detail in this booklets conclusion, but I should say that, in current guerrilla struggle across the globe, computer terrorism has been integral in the foundation of new guerrilla fronts.Information and software for computer hacking itself is available on the Internet itself (this is no secret), and from some suppliers of C.D. ROMs.


The guerrilla propaganda group, in itself, should aim to set up as an issue of cultural support.As the issue of guerrilla war is escalated, the propaganda group should exploit their support; thus expanding the support of the issue, ultimately in the name of the revolutionary cause.The role of the propaganda group, as stated, is to build support for the guerrilla.

The causes which inspire a guerrilla campaign are most often cultural, but a guerrilla propaganda group does not necessarily have to support a guerrilla cause.However, if it does, and this publication assumes it does, then you (the propaganda head, spokesperson etc.), will be working on the same cultural support as that of the guerrilla as a wider cause.The theory and intention is that, as this underground gains momentum against its oppressors, the State, then this will inspire the underground into revolution.Different guerrilla causes may have differing aims from this, but in this, it is not always a necessity that there has to be a guerrilla to support in order to set up a propaganda unit.However, from the point of view of this publication it would help.In this debate I feel it appropriate to explain the philosophy of my own group, who set up to inspire guerrilla warfare rather than to support a guerrilla cause as it existed on the street.

3.15.My own group was run more as a pressure group than a paramilitary.We started out as a catalyst within prostitution, exploiting a situation of cultural unrest in the name of directly supporting militants involved in prostitution.The propaganda group was set up to support a movement that had the potential to become a revolutionary cause.The history of this issue is available in the practical run down of how we set up, in 'Propaganda Groups', previously published by ourselves.The main this to be pointed out is that, whilst we initially had support from the left, an active guerrilla unit would have given us a sound on going issue to support, and would therefore have given us the back up to make our issue one of cultural support.In this we really needed the sort of advice we now offer in 'Propaganda Groups', and we offer this publication as a lesson in our mistakes.

3.16.Aim to build support.Make an issue of the popularity of the group amongst supporters.Keep good relations in order to have supporters escalate the cause.Escalate victories.Above all, utilise every last issue and every last icon of support.Once the group is set up, the group is expanding to support the revolutionary cause.This should be obvious.Expanding support is similar to a political party building support for their representative.More on this in Chapter Five, 'Political Representation'.Keep your ear to the ground; if at all possible, don't take chances with support.


When all of this has been put into effect, the guerrilla unit must examine its own role in the revolution as a greater issue.The propaganda group is supporting the guerrilla as a cultural issue; and this cultural issue as a wider scene, is the revolution.Now for some theory:

Revolution is the amassed solidarity of the people against authority.In some cases this is led by a guerrilla cause, as was the case in Cuba and Nicaragua.It is important that guerrilla causes are aware of the nature of various revolutions around the world, if only for them to be able to analyse their own role and justify their stance.Whether or not the guerrilla is capable of inspiring revolt on this scale, is an issue to be evaluated with honesty and a real understanding of the issues involved in that cause for which you fight.

3.18.A successful propaganda war was waged by Class War in the 90's, without supporting any guerrilla movement at all.The history of Class War is one that must be considered by all propaganda guerrillas.It is an example of cultural dissent being made into a revolutionary issue through propaganda.Although Class War have never supported guerrillas, their example is important.The following is a discussion of the involvement of Class War as an issue.

3.19.As an example of how it is important to study the examples of revolutions, the example of the uprising against the Poll Tax is probably the most important in the context of this publication.The Class War issue is one where propaganda played an important role in the overthrow of the State.Class War considered themselves to be purely a 'propaganda group', with no support for any guerrilla organisation, whilst still being the most major representation of the revolution as it manifested itself in retalliation to the authority of the State in proposing a new form of taxation.Without Class War, the solidarity of the people would have been countered and oppressed by the police, and the riots that were apparent as the manifestation of defiance, would have had no real base of support.Class War were important in converging the movement of unrest; pulling the divergent strategy of unrest into a consolidated cause.This example is the most important demonstration of how a propaganda group is necessary to the revolutionary cause, and similar examples of revolution demonstrate direct lessons for the revolutionary guerrilla.It is important for heads to keep a clear strategy; but it is also important for the entire group to have a knowledge of the past uprisings of this, and other, countries.


Further than the objectives of the group, the ultimate goal of the group is to support and inspire revolution.Revolution is the ultimate realisation of the guerrilla cause, and many groups using this information, will be out to inspire revolution from the onset.It is possible:it is our demand.


"When the tyranny of the State has been overthrown, there will be one tyranny left to overthrow; and that will be the tyranny that overthrew it in the first place"


4.1.THE STATE.The ultimate tyranny we stand to overthrow, is the State itself.But guerrillas are only a small part of that needed to overthrow it.This heading is written to say, do not under estimate the power of the State.The State is a gigantic military machine, but it can be overthrown.In this consideration, guerrillas must evaluate whether it is the State they oppose, or just its symptoms.If it is to overthrow the State, then guerrillas must evaluate does the revolution pose a better alternative, or just another State?

4.2.In recent rebellions of the East, it is not unknown for a guerrilla to set up a "revolutionary council" State.It is not an unreasonable prospect that guerrillas may eventually do this here.This is not something that we would support.Theoretically, State is a term for a structure in society that upholds the ruling classes.In this the entire purpose of the State is to crush, and control, subversion.As a propaganda organisation, we would question the whole ethic of replacing one State with another.We are anarchist.Without going into the arguments involved with anarchism, we would support a propaganda organisation being based entirely around sympathiser support, without being set up to impose a new dictatorship on anyone.At the same time, we would not support the propaganda group supporting any issue other than those beliefs held by the group as a greater unified cause.


The whole idea of a propaganda group, is to counter the State propaganda against guerrillas.In this, it should be taken into account that the State will counter this also.It is for this reason that the group is a part of the guerrilla organisation; the propaganda group must be clever and it must be ready to counter the propaganda of State media with intelligence and wit.

The propaganda that the State will use is complex, and we cannot give advice in countering State propaganda in general; this State propaganda will be very clever, and the guerrilla cause must account for everything.The only advice that we can offer is learn from your mistakes and the mistakes of others.A good example of a successful strategy in propaganda, is that of the French Situationist International with their postal address, as follows:

4.4.The Situationist International used the same box address through the entire history of their campaign.Due to the nature of situationism being directly subversive, the French press and the State threw everything they had at them in the name of screwing up the French situationist movement.Strategies of the State included the media claiming that the box address was a fascist address, which was apparently one of the more difficult situations to counter. The strategy of the Situationist International was to keep the same address going throughout, as the main tactic against media corruption.This strategy apparently worked, and is a good example of how a propaganda group can counter State corruption.


Things have moved on from the days of the Situationist International, and the most dangerous threat to subversives today, is the media monitoring of thought.

The monitoring of thought on guerrillas is a relatively new tactic for the press, and we believe that we have already played this tactic; hence the Mission Statement at the start of, and the reasons for, this publication.Before discussing the implications of, and the strategy against, the monitoring of thought, we should dedicate a sub head to the discussion of the media as a part of the State.

4.6.The media exist for no other reason than to uphold the authority of the State.This should be assumed by everyone involved with the propaganda unit, as with the guerrilla organisation as a whole.

The take over of media resources is a main objective for guerrilla cells, and during the European uprisings of the early 90s', T.V. and radio channels were taken over by rioters.This is a better goal than the setting up of pirate radio channels, although the setting up of autonomous communication (pirate radio and literature), should still not be overlooked.

4.7.The media will initially have the support of the masses.In this they are, very, powerful, and this is not to be underestimated.An example of this is in the reporting around the I.R.A. up until the present day.As explained briefly in 2.9., the I.R.A. were a legitimate cause fighting counter terrorism in the name of the liberation of their country from a foreign dictatorship.Whilst the majority of Irish Catholics, those who the I.R.A. set out to protect, supported the issue, the media in Britain completely brainwashed the people to the extent that the I.R.A. were considered a target.It was not the strategy of the I.R.A. to counter this very much, but it should be taken as the most obvious example of the press control of guerrilla struggle.


The most frightening new development in the State 'control of guerrillas', is the media monitoring of thought.T.V. and radio thought police tactics have been protected by a conspiracy of silence by the papers, this being a serious threat to the operation of guerrilla cells; the monitoring of thought itself being a bigger threat to security.To date, the victims of this media tactic have kept a sound guerrilla front; thus setting it up for guerrilla support, should this media strategy escalate on, what the press see as being, "terrorists".

4.9.If any situation should arise whereby any part of the media set up in the monitoring of thought upon your own organisation, the guerrilla should be aware of the strategy as it already exists.Further than that, propaganda should be exploited to the furthest degree, to build public support on the issues of 'Big Brother', and '1984'.

The strategy as it already exists, is to set up the campaigner in question as the major spokesperson for the cause.This exploits the situation of psychology being exploited; using psychology to build public support.In this situation, the guerrilla should exploit the insane nature of the situation to get themselves sectioned in mental hospital, before the press take the opportunity to send the vanguard to prison.

In this situation, the guerrilla in question should be seen as the vanguard, this in order that, should the strategy escalate to any other guerrilla, their group will already have support on which to ground a propaganda campaign against media State.

The last point to remember is that, the press are deliberately using this strategy to threaten the security of the organisation.Thought monitoring should be considered by all guerrillas, and should be considered as another reason to keep tight security.


At all points before, during and after a guerrilla campaign, be aware that anyone with a knowledge of group activities, can always be arrested.This may sound obvious, but it cannot be emphasised enough.Security is the most integral issue, from the very onset of any guerrilla campaign, and the tactics of police and army operations should be researched.If used properly, this booklet provides many important rules for security (Figure 1.6.1. as the structure for all manoeuvres), but security should be as organised as can silently be achieved.One rule is that no one should be aware of any operation, other than that they are directly involved with.This considered, the propaganda unit should be more aware of the views of sympathisers than the workings of the guerrilla themselves, although if anything is important, it should be discussed with, and dealt with by, only the individuals directly involved.However, a knowledge of guerrilla tactics is important, and this is the reason for this publication being written under the monitoring of thought, as discussed in 4.8.


The guerrilla should have a good knowledge of forensics.Although this is more important for the direct action front (explosives planters, gunmen etc., assuming that the group employ these tactics), the propaganda group should be aware of the implications of finding themselves with a forensic record.Information about how to get round forensics should be available on the Internet, but for the purposes of the propaganda unit, alertness to the practise of police forensics is less important.A propaganda group may want to be aware of fingerprinting, handwriting etc. but, as it stands, if the police want to aquire forensic evidence, they will most often be able to do it.More information on the practicalities of forensics for propaganda groups, is available from ourselves in our pamphlet discussed earlier.


Guerrillas in custody have one strategy, and that is, not to answer questions.This will seem obvious to anyone with any knowledge of police questioning, but whatever the police throw at you; never answer questions.

The police are clever."We've already got the information we need from your friend in the next cell","We've got a case against you, tell us who you work for and we'll let you off"and "We're going to kick you shitless", are all police tactics.At all times the guerrilla should answer no questions; no matter how heavy the charges threatened against them.In any situation whereby this is not possible, the security of the group should be tight enough to dictate that sensitive or incriminating information is not known.In the event of charges being pressed by the police, the organisation should have a strategy for prison.Chapter Five discusses the role of propaganda for prison support.


In the event of being sent to prison, remember the motto of the Anarchist Black Cross: "the struggle continues".Prison is not the end.An organised guerrilla campaign will support their prisoners as a political issue.The issue of prisoner support is covered at the end of Chapter Five.

Having no experience of prison myself, I can only say that prison should be considered an opportunity to interact with other guerrillas (and anyone else convicted of a political offence).In the event of an emergency, one tactic that should be remembered, is that, over the past decade, waves of prison riots have been successfully organised by stealing the keys.This is a tactic that warders cannot easily get round, but is a tactic that should be taken as a guerrilla activity in itself and, in that, is a very serious manoeuvre to be seen to be involved with.


It is not necessarily the case that everyone who is in a psychiatric hospital is mentally ill.They say that Broadmoor is full of sane people and, at the risk of being controversial, it can sometimes be better to find yourself in a hospital rather than a prison.Having said that, if you are sent down, then it is not the option of the organisation to send the guerrilla to one prison as opposed to any other.With stealth the guerrilla can utilise the situation to keep manoeuvres undercover, taking care to stay on a small dose of psychiatric medication.However, in saying this, the people in psychiatric hospitals are likely to be far more dangerous.This considered, hospital is not the place to be considered a political prisoner (you may wish to take this into consideration here), as my own experience has shown.Despite this I have been involved in hunger strikes in hospital.I am not saying that an organisation should try to get guerrillas sectioned; only that a Section 3 may be more appropriate to the cause of keeping the organisation underground if the police have no evidence with which to convict.A point to bear in mind is that my own propaganda unit have been run from a hospital for the past six years.


"Philosophers have only interpreted society in a number of different ways.The point, however, is to change it."



The revolution is the amassed solidarity of the people.The role of the guerrilla is to represent the people at the head of the revolution.In this the guerrilla must have their ear to the ground.The role of the propaganda group is to gauge public support and to escalate this in the name of the overthrow of authority, tyranny and the State.

5.2.The revolution does not necessarily need a guerrilla cause.At the same time, revolutions have been successfully represented by guerrillas.It is widely accepted that guerrillas support a revolutionary cause but, at the same time we must consider the role of the 'counter terrorist'.

Terrorism is a term for the random and indiscriminate destruction of a target, whereby people may be killed regardless of whether they support the cause, and regardless to who they are.Guerrilla warfare is the term for the planned destruction of authority in the name of the cause.Counter terrorism is the term for guerrilla tactics employed against the guerrilla cause.Counter terrorism has no role to play in revolution as, in retalliation to a right wing guerrilla, the revolution should use different tactics.These definitions should at all times be considered.

5.3.It is the view of this organisation, that paramilitaries should set up as a catalyst for revolution, to lead the masses and set up, as paramilitaries, to build revolutionary councils, through the structure of paramilitary cells as they are established as described.Whilst not imposing this view, it accounts for the actual reality of the nature of revolution.Guerrillas should at all times be aware of the manifestation of revolution as an everyday occurrence; they should have sound intelligence in the form of a ground level propaganda group.We would suggest that the individual situation of revolution be the only situation on which to base a strategy.


When all this has been implemented, the role of the propaganda group crosses into the example of a capitalistic marketing organisation.It would be useful for the propaganda group to have a knowledge of how marketing works: this stands as the case with politicians, charities and non profit groups.As a propaganda group operates within the law, they should be conscious of their strategy.

5.5.In researching the role of the guerrilla, 'watchers' should be elected to constantly keep up to date with State propaganda from the papers, radio and T.V.The more reporting an issue gets, the more support the issue is likely to have.State propaganda exists as a means of social control.Alternatively, a presence at demonstrations can often be effective as a way of monitoring support for guerrillas, should the cause be represented in this manner, as it is with a revolutionary cause.As well as this, the active role of the organisation, as it exists in society, can be effectively monitored through watching the support gained by the nearest relevant pressure campaigns that support the issue.


This publication has briefly covered the issue of public support.In the case of a resistance group, public support may not be necessary.In other cases it may not be necessary to monitor exactly what degree of public support the group or cause may have.Either way, it is imperative that the guerrilla cause take the issue of public support into consideration.This is mainly achieved through planning activities in the knowledge of what sympathisers will support.Whilst this is imperative for the guerrilla, it is up to the propaganda group to establish exactly what support this may be.

5.7.This is usually directed in the form of some sort of political representation; the publication we have mentioned being a good example of how to do this through pressure campaigning.The issue of 'political representation' in the form of 'parties' etc. is covered below.

The propaganda group can monitor the general scale of public support through the activities mentioned previously in 5.6.; employing petitions or surveys through the post, as used by the Guerilla Press, to initially set up the group.These tactics are discussed in general in 'Propaganda Groups', which we intend to be publicly disseminated in the name of resistance.Along the lines of this publication, the propaganda group should operate as a 'non profit group', or as a front operating along these lines.On this level, again we suggest reading up on marketing; although capitalistic, they use tactics useful to the cause of the guerrilla propaganda unit.Further than that, a successful propaganda group may ultimately seek political representation.


Democracy is a front to delay the revolution.However, in the past, guerrillas have been known to have success in standing politicians for election.Examples to hand are those of Sinn Fien as the "political wing of the I.R.A.", and Plaid Cwmru as a political front supporting the Welsh arson group, the Mabion Glendower.This publication can not cover the many technicalities of setting up a parliamentary front and, anyway, we believe there is no parliamentary road to revolution.Anyway, parliament is still an effective way of monitoring localised or national support, if not a way in which to fight for the rights of guerrillas or for the cause.The general idea is explained as follows:


Demands are concessions to be met by the State in the short term before a revolutionary overthrow of power.It is for politicians to step down to demands as the end of our dispute or for the fundament of the preconditions for revolution.In the case of our own group, our demand is for the legalisation of prostitution.On one level, this is in order for the prostitutes to be able to work, as they are forced to in most cases, without being further persecuted by the police.On the level of the greater cause, it works for the purposes of the prostitutes as a catalyst to inspire the organised revolution we stand to support.

5.10.In the name of this demand, we will continually put pressure on the government to meet this demand.If they don't then it provokes us into overthrowing the State.We stand to do this anyway, but if the demand is met, it sets up the preconditions of the revolution that will eventually take place.It is for the politicians to meet our demand.


In ending this publication, I feel that I should write something on demands and the nature of revolution.

The primary causes of revolt in this country, the mine closures, Wapping and the Poll Tax, have not been led by guerrillas, and have not had political demands, as such.These situations have all been revolutionary, and have arisen due to the oppression of Conservative Party State upon the proletariat.Strangeways was a slightly different situation, as it was organised by guerrillas, although this too had no political demand.Despite this, there is no reason why this country should not have a revolutionary guerrilla cause.

Public opinion has been largely corrupted by the media reporting of the I.R.A., who campaigned successfully, to an extent, for the liberation of Ireland as a foreign country.This reporting should not mean that Britain should not have a revolutionary cause, although it has changed public support for guerrillas.

5.12.It is in the nature of the revolution, that there will always be conflict between the classes.This will be obvious to all revolutionary guerrillas.In the course of running the campaign, the guerrilla cause will realise the reasons for the oppression exercised by the State.However this oppression be exposed by the guerrilla, the State will use everything they have to hang on to their privileged positions of power.In the outcome they will use their prisons for their purposes.Thus the importance of prisoner support.


As this publication closes, it is necessary to discuss our retort to the State oppression of the guerrilla cause.Prison is the contort to our liberation.

Therefore, prison should be the main issue of the propaganda group, even if it is the only issue of the propaganda group.

5.14.It is necessary to support guerrillas in prison for a number of reasons; not least to exploit the situation in the name of the guerrilla cause of the issue as a greater thing.The history of guerrilla warfare is the history of prisoner support, and prisoner support is vital to the continued operations of the organisation.For a start, if there is no solidarity for interned guerrillas, then people will be reluctant to join the movement.The next important point is that, once a guerrilla has been imprisoned, they are a potential vanguard.The prison system is unpopular, and as an issue, interned guerrillas will have a wide level of sympathiser support.Guerrillas in prison should be supported as a main issue for the cause, and posters, leaflets and stickers should be printed in order to establish a support campaign.Without prisoner support, the group will be seen as being an 'elite', and will lose support.

5.15.A number of prison support groups exist to support class struggle prisoners.These groups, such as a network of Anarchist Black Cross groups exist across the globe, and should be supported from the onset.Remember that anyone at all who is a part of the guerrilla struggle can be sent to prison; even if they have broken no law they can be held under the Prevention of Terrorism, or Mental Health, Acts.We are all a target for the State, but we should expect a right to be supported by our cause.If nothing else, that is the necessary solidarity of the cause.


6.1.The future of guerrilla warfare lies in computer hacking.Multinationals can be stopped, nuclear power stations put on alert and the police sent on a wild goose chase.E-mail will become the next media for guerrilla communiqués; it leaves no fingerprints or forensic evidence.Threats will be issued through video e-mail, and propaganda statements divulged to anyone who takes an interest through Web pages.CyberSpace cannot be regulated, all are equal on the Internet, and guerrillas can operate in secrecy.This is the future.

6.2.We wish to see a society where this would be the means of our emancipation.In CyberSpace all are equal, and we would fight for a revolution built by paramilitaries against the State, offering equality and justice over the Internet.This will be built by guerrillas, and it is in the name of the propaganda strategy supported throughout this publication, that this publication will be issued in the name of.

6.3.Goodnight, little children, goodnight.Goodnight, little children, goodnight.Goodnight, little children, goodnight.Goodnight, little children, goodnight.


1.1.Reasons for a guerrilla campaign.Some points to consider before the start of a guerrilla campaign, and the issues for a propaganda campaign.

1.2.Discussion of the role of guerrilla warfare, and consideration of various tactics available to the issue.

1.3.Discussing the reasons to enter guerrilla warfare, the risks, and the victories of some recent struggles.

1.4.A propaganda group must have clear objectives.Discussion of the objectives of the campaign.

1.5.Reasons for objectives; objectives must be reasonable.

1.6.Setting up as a guerrilla, and the structure of the group.Strategy.

1.7.Discussing Figure 1.6.1.

1.8.The role of the head in the guerrilla unit.Suggestions for the strategy of the head, and the issue of the Supergrass briefly covered.

1.9.Camaraderie of the guerrilla front, foundation of the direct action unit, and initial security issues to be considered.

1.10.The role of the propaganda group in countering the press.A consideration of the tactics and the role of the media.

1.11.The interaction of the propaganda unit and the heads of the guerrilla unit.

1.12.Strategy of the propaganda group as an independent unit, and which strategy they should support.

1.13.The politics of the propaganda group.Have guerrilla units in the past been too political?

1.14.The role of the propaganda group in issuing the Manifesto of the cause.

1.15.A statement in upholding the guerrilla manifesto (should one be issued).

2.1.Consideration of the issues of security in the guerrilla organisation.

2.2.The advice of the First of May.Security issues to be considered in the procedure of printing.

2.3.The philosophy taken by ourselves, in the structure of a propaganda unit, and the A.L.F. strategy in propaganda.

2.4.The practicalities and initial strategy for the propaganda group; to be taken into consideration from the onset.

2.5.The nature of the group, and strategies for the issuing of communiqués.

2.6.Communicating with the press.

2.7.Escalating the issue.

2.8.The underground of guerrilla support.

2.9.Strategies for the propaganda of guerrilla organisations, in the past three decades, in Britain and Ireland.

2.10.The propaganda of the Angry Brigade.

2.11.Dissemination; the strategy of our own group.

3.1.Changing tactics if the objective of the guerrilla should change.

3.2.Public support.Sympathisers.

3.3.A short paragraph on the issue of fundraising.

3.4.Discussion of the support of the paramilitary in the action of fundraising.Issues to be considered.

3.5.The issue of pirate radio.Considerations in technology as a tool for the overthrow of the State.

3.6.General considerations in the use of radio for subversion.

3.7.Further considerations of pirate radio.Considerations around the capture of radio units.

3.8.Practicalities in the organisation of pirate radio.

3.9.Practicalities in the use of the Internet.

3.10.Tactics and the use of the Internet.

3.11.The Internet and tactics for the dissemination of propaganda.


3.13.A brief statement in the merits of computer hackery.

3.14.Discussion of the role of the propaganda group in the event of the previous having been initiated.Discussion on escalating support.

3.15.A brief mention of the history of our own group.

3.16.Advice, the above taken into consideration.

3.17.The propaganda group in the role of the revolution.Revolution and the guerrilla cause.

3.18.Class War as an example.

3.19.Class War as an example of how a revolutionary propaganda group were active in a situation of revolt.

3.20.A review of the role of the propaganda group in the consideration of the above.

4.1.Evaluating objectives and a discussion of the overthrow of the State or a revolutionary diresque.

4.2.A discussion of the revolutionary cause and the overthrow of the State.

4.3.A discussion of the role of State propaganda, introducing an example strategy.

4.4.The strategy of the French Situationist International in the countering of propaganda from the State.

4.5.About the media tactic of monitoring thought.

4.6.The reasons for State propaganda against guerrillas, including tactics for civil revolt.

4.7.Short discussion of historical examples of media propaganda against guerrillas.

4.8.Discussion of tactics around the media monitoring of thought.

4.9.Our suggested strategy to retaliate in the event of the press monitoring of thought upon your own organisation.

4.10.General issues of security; the tactics of guerrilla operations.

4.11.Consideration of the relevance of forensics and its implications for the guerrilla front.

4.12.The implications of police questioning; and guerrilla tactics for internment and police cells.

4.13.Prison as a consequence of guerrilla struggle, and strategies for riot in prison.

4.14.Sectioning as a tactic for the State.Tactics for psychiatric hospital: State sectioning as control of guerrilla struggle.

5.1.The role of the guerrilla, and the propaganda group, in the ultimate situation of revolution.

5.2.Brief definitions of guerrilla strategies.The role of 'counter terrorism' against the cause of the guerrilla.

5.3.The guerrilla unit as a model for society; and the strategy of this group.

5.4.Suggesting a strategy with the tactics of marketing.

5.5.Pressure groups and strategies for monitoring support for the guerrilla cause.

5.6.Strategies as regards the guerrilla unit; some suggestions.

5.7.Strategies for a propaganda group operating within the law.

5.8.Discussion around the tactics of representation by politicians.

5.9.Demands and their relevance to the guerrilla cause.

5.10.Our demand, and how it is upheld by the guerrilla organisation.

5.11.Some history of the role of guerrillas in this countries revolutionary cause.

5.12.Guerrilla struggle and the power of the State.

5.13.Prison and the propaganda group.

5.14.Tactics for prisoner support.

5.15.Last note on prison and the power of the State.

6.1.A note on the future of guerrilla warfare.

6.2.Conclusion.The history of this organisation.

6.3.Goodnight, little children, goodnight.